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10 Export-Oriented Growth and 
Trade Patterns of Korea 
Wontack Hong 
10.1 Introduction 
The first objective of this paper is to analyze the relationship between 
the export-oriented growth strategy and the high growth performance 
of the Korean economy, on the one hand, and the relationship between 
the shifting comparative advantage and the manufactures trade pattern 
of Korea, on the other. The second objective is to analyze the impact 
of subsidized credit rationing, which was adopted as one of the major 
policy measures to promote export expansion in Korea, upon the pat- 
tern of manufactures trade. 
The four principal policy measures that have been adopted in Korea 
to pursue its export-oriented growth strategy consist of vigorous ad- 
ministrative supports for export promotion, a preferential tax system 
and subsidy allocation for export activities, and reduction of the import 
substitution biases in the Korean economy. In general, the more 
severe the bias of commodity market distortions for import substitu- 
tion activities, the stronger should be the first three measures to pro- 
mote export activities. Since there already exists a vast amount of 
literature dealing with the details of the export promotion policies that 
have been followed by the Korean government (see Hong 1979; Frank, 
Kim, and Westphal 1975; Krueger 1979), this study concentrates on 
the subsidy allocation in the form of low-interest-rate bank loans in 
relation to the sectoral orientation of investments and the character- 
istics of the leading export sectors.* That is, this paper concentrates 
on capital market distortions and their impact on production and trade 
patterns. 
Wontack Hong is professor of international economics, Seoul University, Seoul, Korea. 
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Section 10.2 analyzes the relationship between the export-oriented 
growth strategy and the high growth performance of the Korean econ- 
omy in terms of the productivity-enhancing and savings-increasing ef- 
fects of export promotion. Sections 10.3 and 10.4 examine the rising 
real wages, capital intensity, and changing patterns of manufactures 
production and trade over the period 1960-80. Section 10.5 examines 
credit rationing at low interest rates, and the last two sections examine 
the impact of subsidized credit rationing on the pattern of manufactures 
exports. 
10.2 Export-Oriented Growth Strategy and the Growth Performance 
of Korea 
As a result of significant distortions in commodity markets that were 
heavily biased toward import substitution activities, the labor-abundant 
Korean economy had not actively taken advantage of the gains from 
trade B la Heckscher-Ohlin in the 1950s and maintained a semiautarkic 
state until the beginning of the 1960s. Even after the initiation of its 
export-oriented growth strategy, Korea was not a free trade economy. 
However, the import substitution biases caused by import restrictions, 
though they could not be removed entirely, have been more than offset 
by the vigorous government policies promoting manufactured exports. 
While the absolute magnitude of Korea’s exports amounted to only 
about $20 million a year in the 1950s, exports expanded so rapidly in 
the 1960s and 1970s as to reach more than $21 billion by 1981. Fur- 
thermore, the proportion of commodities with SITC code numbers 5 
through 8 (which are usually classified as manufactured goods) in total 
exports expanded from less than 15% in 1960 to 77% in 1970 and to 
about 90% in 1981.3 
Prior to the initiation of vigorous export promotion, the comparative 
advantage of Korea in labor-intensive manufactures remained merely 
a potential one. In this sense, Korea’s export-oriented growth in the 
1960s and thereafter may be regarded as the process of opening up the 
Korean economy to semifree trade. According to Corden (1971), the 
opening up of an economy to trade generates a “static” efficiency gain, 
which is very similar to a “once-and-for-all” technical progress in 
raising the absorption possibility frontier of a country at the given factor 
supplies. Furthermore, with a given constant propensity to save, the 
static efficiency gain itself will induce the rate of capital accumulation 
to rise and consequently will raise the growth rate of the economy, 
which might be described as the “induced growth gain” from trade. If 
investment goods were mostly imported, then this induced growth gain 
will also include the effect of reduced prices of investment goods. On 
the other hand, the opening up to free trade may raise the “rate” of 
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growth of an economy not only through the static efficiency gain and 
the associated induced growth gain but also by directly raising the 
propensity to save of the country. 
If instantaneous structural adjustments are assumed, as Corden (1971) 
does, the static efficiency gains would materialize instantaneously. 
However, the opening up of a semiautarkic economy to semifree trade 
may occur over an extended period of time. Then, the static efficiency 
gains from the opening up to free trade may materialize year after year 
over a long period of time. Furthermore, the so-called static efficiency 
gains may be broadly interpreted to include the Keesing-B hagwati- 
Krueger (Keesing 1967; Bhagwati and Krueger, 1973) type of positive 
effects of intensified international competition upon the quality of do- 
mestic entrepreneurship, the realization of internal scale economies, 
and the exploitation of external economies that arise from the “infant” 
export production activities. 
In the 1950s, the imports of Korea were mostly financed by foreign 
aid, much of it on very concessional terms. The freeing of the Korean 
economy to trade (as measured by the ratio of exports to GNP) occurred 
over an extended period of time covering the 1960s and 1970s. The 
efficiency gains from trade have materialized partly in the form of 
rapidly increasing real wage rates and partly in the form of rising rates 
of return on investment. The average rates of return on investment in 
the Korean manufacturing sector increased from 13% in 1954-61 to 
about 23% in 1972-79 (see table 10.1). Over the period 1962-81, there 
also have been rapid increases in domestic savings, which, together 
with the productivity gains from trade, maintained nearly a 10% average 
annual growth rate of the GNP (table 10.2). 
During the inward-looking growth period of 1953-61, the export 
share of Korea’s GNP amounted to only about 3%. With the initiation 
of the outward-looking growth strategy in the early 1960s, the export 
GNP share rose rapidly from about 8% in 1962-66 to about 38% in 
1977-81. The average annual growth rate of GNP rose from about 4% 
in 1953-61 to about 8% in 1962-66 and to about 10% in 1967-76. 
Because of the political turmoil associated with the assassination of 
President Park and a minus 6% growth in 1980, the average annual 
growth rate for 1977-81 fell to about 6%. However, if 1980 is excluded, 
the average growth rate for 1977-81 amounts to nearly 9%. 
Domestic savings increased from about 4% of GNP in 1953-61 to 
about 24% of GNP in 1977-81. On the other hand, the proportion of 
gross investment in GNP rose from about 16% in 1962-66 to about 
30% in 1977-8 1 .  Consequently, although domestic savings increased 
rapidly, Korea had to maintain substantial foreign capital inflows 
throughout the period 1962-81 because of the vigorous pace of in- 
vestment activities. 
Table 10.1 Average A M U ~  Rates of Return on Investment in Manufacturing: Korea 
(A) (B) (C) (D) 
Incremental Share of Ratio of Estimated Estimated Rates of Return 
Output- Capital in Net Working Capital 
Capital Value Added Capital to Gain (El (F) (G)  
Ratio (1-0 Data) Fixed Assets (perannum) = (A x B) = E/(1 + C) = (F - D) 
1954-61 
1962-66 
1967-71 
1972-76 
1977-79 
1980 
1981 
1982 
0.345 
0.448 
0.441 
0.679 
0.594 
- 0.033 
0.343 
0.199 
0.520 
0.520 
0.517 
0.592 
0.546 
0.602 
0.602 
0.602 
0.300 
0.300 
0.183 
0.268 
0.112 
-0.017 
-0.069 
-0.044 
-0.01 
-0.03 
-0.01 
-0.09 
-0.06 
-0.20 
-0.09 
0.03 
0.18 
0.23 
0.23 
0.40 
0.32 
0.21 
0.12 
-0.02 - 
0.14 
0.18 
0.20 
0.32 
0.29 
- 0.02 
0.23 
0.13 
- 
0.13 
0.15 
0.19 
0.23 
0.23 
0.22 
0.14 
0.13 
Sources: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, National Income in Korea, various issues; and idem, Input-Output 
Tables of Korea, various issues. 
Notes: (A) Gross incremental value-added/fixed-capital ratios were computed allowing a one-year time lag between the increase 
in value added (at a 1975 constant factor cost) and gross fixed capital formation. 
(B) Imputed wages for unpaid family workers were excluded from the share of capital in value added. 
(C) In order to take account of the fact that most firms also use (net) working capital in addition to fixed capital, the rates- 
of-return figures were deflated by the amount of net working capital. 
(D) Capital loss was approximated by the differences between the rates of increase in average prices of capital goods and 
those of the wholesale price index for all commodities. Estimates (G) differ from those in Hong 1979 (p. 189): 12% in 1954-61, 
17% in 1962-66, 26% in 1967-71, and 27% in 1972-75. Estimates in this table use income statistics of 1975 as base year and 
incremental-value-added/gross-investment ratios, while the estimates of Hong 1979 use income statistics of 1970 as base year 
and the inverse of ICOR (incremental-capital-output ratios) in computing output attributed to gross investment. For a more 
detailed discussion on the estimation of the rate of return on investment see Hong 1979, 176-96. 
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Table 10.2 Growth, Savings, and Trade Balance in Korea (percentages) 
~ 
A. Growth Rate (annual averages) 
GNP Manufacturing ICOR 
1953-61 
1962-66 
1967-71 
1972-76 
1977-79 
1980 - 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
4.0 
7.9 
9.7 
9.7 
9.6 
5.2 
6.2 
5.6 
9.5 
7.6 
10.5 
15.1 
21.8 
19.2 
15.9 
-1.1 
7.2 
4.0 
10.8 
14.6 
1.3 
2.3 
2.8 
2.7 
3.8 
4.4 
5.8 
3.8 
- 
B. Ratio to GNP 
Gross Domestic Foreign Commodity Commodity 
Investment Saving Saving Exports Imports 
1953-61 12.4 4.4 8.0 
1962-66 16.3 7.7 8.6 
1967-71 25.7 15.6 10.1 
1972-76 27.0 20.3 6.7 
1977-79 31.5 27.9 3.6 
1980 31.3 21.9 9.4 
1981 29.1 21.4 7.7 
1982 27.0 22.5 4.5 
1983 27.6 24.7 2.9 
1984 29.9 27.6 2.3 
Source: Bank of Korea, National Income Accounts: 1984. 
1.1 
4.4 
9.5 
23.7 
25.9 
29.8 
32.7 
31.5 
32.9 
34.4 
10.6 
15.3 
22.8 
31.0 
30.0 
36.9 
37.0 
33.9 
33.8 
34.4 
During 1962-71, government savings amounted to about 5.8% of 
GNP on average, of which about 30% was generated by tariff revenue. 
Government savings amounted to 4.0% and 6.1% of GNP during 1972- 
76 and 1977-81, respectively, and the proportion contributed by tariff 
revenue expanded from 48% in 1972-76 to 95% in 1977-81. 
During 1953-81, around 20% of total investment was allocated to 
the manufacturing sector, around 10% to the primary sectors, and the 
rest to the service and social overhead sectors. Throughout the period, 
the manufacturing sector grew approximately twice as rapidly as the 
whole economy. During 1963-79, the total number of employed persons 
increased by about 3.5% per annum, while the number of workers 
employed in manufacturing increased by about 10% per annum (table 
10.3). As a result, the proportion of manufacturing output in GNP rose 
from about 9% in 1953 to about 14% in 1960, to about 21% in 1970, 
and to about 30% by 1981. The manufacturing sector absorbed only 
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Table 10.3 Rising Real Wages and Capital Intensity of Korean Manufacturing 
~~~~ 
1960 1968 1980 
Capital stock (in millions won) 
Employees’ remuneration (in miilions won) 
Number of workers 
Per worker capital stock 
In millions current won 
In millions of 1980 dollars wona 
In thousands of 1980 dollarsb (k)  
In millions current won 
In millions of 1980 dollars wonC 
In thousands of 1980 dollarsb ( w )  
Wage rate 
Labor share in value added 
Elasticity of substitutiond 
Av. annual (dk/k)/(dw/w): 1960-80 
Av. annual (dk/k)/(dw/w): 1968-80 
$ 24,131 $332,790 $10,727,405 
$ 6,765 $ 77,058 $ 3,471,631 
275,254 748,307 2,014,751 
$ 0.088 $ 0.445 $ 5.324 
$ 1.956 $ 2.853 $ 5.324 
$ 3.190 $ 4.650 $ 8.680 
$ 0.025 $ 0.103 $ 1.723 
$ 0.373 $ 0.510 $ 1.723 
$ 0.608 $ 0.831 $ 2.809 
31% 26% 29% 
(5.0%)/(8.0%) = 0.63 
(5.5%)/(10.5%) = 0.52 
Sources: Economic Planning Board, Report on Mining and Manufacturing Census; and 
Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook. 
aApplying the GNP deflator for gross fixed capital formation in manufacturing. (Land is 
excluded from fixed assets.) 
bApplying the exchange rate of 613.4 won per dollar. 
CApplying the GNP deflator for value added in manufacturing. 
dPoint elasticities of capital-labor substitution estimated by assuming constant rental 
price for capital service over the period covered. If the rental price for capital service 
had actually been falling over the periods covered, the true point elasticities should be 
smaller than these estimates. 
about 8% of total employment in 1963, but it absorbed about 13% of 
total workers in 1970 and 20% of the total by 1981. 
The opening up of the Korean economy to trade was associated with 
rapid increases in the aggregate savings propensity, which resulted in 
continuous shifts of Korea’s comparative advantage in international 
trade. Such a rise in the savings propensity may be explained by the 
high marginal propensity to save and rapid increases in per capita 
income, by the highly profitable export activities motivating larger sav- 
ings (especially by entrepreneurs), or by a change in the basic time 
preference structure itself, making people more patient. The opening 
up to trade is equivalent to the discovery of new efficient production 
techniques and, hence, will raise the savings pr~pensi ty .~ The opening 
up to trade might also change thrift, foresight, self-control, and be- 
nevolence of individuals as well as the government so as to raise the 
aggregate  saving^.^ Furthermore, the gains from trade might also sta- 
bilize political conditions and the purchasing power of money, reducing 
the overall risk elements in a society and raising the propensity to save 
(see Fischer 1961, 500-506). 
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10.3 Rising Real Wages and Capital Intensity of Korean 
Manufacturing 
The very high rates of capital formation in Korea have not only 
generated high rates of growth in GNP and manufactured outputs but 
also resulted in rapid increases in real wage rates and significant rises 
in ICOR (incremental-capital-output ratios). During 1967-81, the av- 
erage real wage rate in the manufacturing sector increased by about 
7% per annum if deflated by the GNP deflator for the whole industry, 
and increased by about 10% if deflated by the consumer price index.6 
The ICOR rose from 1.3 in 1953-61 to 2.3 in 1962-66, to 2.75 in 1967- 
76, and then jumped to 4.3 in 1977-81 (excluding 1980). 
If we apply the GNP deflator for value added in manufacturing, the 
average real wage rate for workers employed in the manufacturing 
sector increased by only about 37% during 1960-68 (from $608 to $831), 
but it increased about 3.4 times during 1968-80 (from $831 to $2,809), 
implying an average annual growth rate of about 10.5%. On the other 
hand, the fixed capital stock per worker in manufacturing (excluding 
land) increased by about 87% during 1968-80, implying an average 
annual growth rate of about 5.5%. If we assume a constant rental price 
for capital service throughout the period 1968-80, the estimated point 
elasticity of capital-labor substitution becomes 0.52 for the period 1968- 
80. However, it may be more reasonable to assume somewhat falling 
prices for capital service in Korea during this period, implying the likely 
upward biases in the above estimate of point elasticity.’ 
The share of wages in value added steadily fell from about 37% in 
1958 to 31% in 1960 and to 23% in 1973. However, the labor share in 
value added started to increase steadily thereafter, reaching about 29% 
in 1980. These shifts in labor share are consistent with the estimated 
point elasticity of capital-labor substitution. In any case, one can con- 
clude that there were rapid increases in real wage rates and the capital 
intensity of the manufacturing sector in Korea during the late 1960s 
and throughout the 1970s. 
10.4 Changing Pattern of Manufactures Production and Trade 
In 1960 less than 14% of Korea’s GNP was contributed by the man- 
ufacturing sector, and furthermore, less than 3% of total manufactured 
products were exported. The only manufacturing sector which had a 
sizable export-output ratio (e) was fish processing (with e = 0.27).8 
The exports of various textile products (including wearing apparel) 
amounted to less than 3% of their ouputs. By 1970, however, more 
than 20% of Korea’s GNP was contributed by the manufacturing sector, 
and about 13% of total manufactured products were exported. The 
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following six sectors had been firmly established as Korea’s major 
export sectors: footwear (with e = 0.28), wearing apparel (with e = 
0.351, miscellaneous manufactures (with e = 0.54), fish products (with 
e = 0.51), veneer and plywood (with e = 0.37), and electronic prod- 
ucts (with e = 0.44).9 The export-output ratios of textile yarn and 
textile fabric also increased to 18% and 15% respectively by 1970. 
In 1980 nearly 30% of Korea’s GNP was contributed by the man- 
ufacturing sector, and about 19% of total manufactured products were 
exported. Four labor-intensive manufacturing sectors have been added 
to the list of Korea’s major manufacturing export sectors: textile fabrics 
(with e = 0.35), metal products (withe = 0.46), precision instruments, 
consisting mostly of watches and optical instruments (with e = 0.42), 
and leather products (with e = 0.46). Textile yarns (with e = 0.18), 
electrical machinery (with e = 0:16), and nonmetallic mineral products 
excluding cement (with e = 0.14) also became important export sectors. 
Throughout the period 1960-80, the electronic products, metal prod- 
ucts, precision instruments, electrical machinery, and leather products 
sectors were heavily import dependent. However, electronic products 
became a major export sector by the end of the 1960s and each of the 
others by the end of the 1970s. All these sectors are classified as export- 
import sectors in the sense that they exported significant proportions 
of their outputs in the 1970s while also being significantly dependent 
on imports. 
The total number of workers employed in manufacturing establish- 
ments with five or more employees increased 2.7 times during 1960- 
68 and also during 1968-80. Among the labor-intensive manufactured 
export sectors, electronics and communications equipment manufac- 
turing contributed most of the labor absorption: from 0.3% of total 
manufacturing employment in 1960 to 1.2% in 1968 and to 7.8% in 1980. 
The proportion of labor employed in the clothing and footwear sectors 
(including leather products) also expanded from about 10% of total 
manufacturing employnEnt in 1968 to 16% of it by 1980. Surprisingly, 
the proportion of labor employed in textiles declined steadily from 
about 30% in 1960 to about 25% in 1968 and to less than 20% in 1980. 
The proportion of labor employed in the wood and furniture sector also 
declined, from about 5.8% in 1968 to about 3.3% in 1980. However, 
the proportion of workers employed in labor-intensive export sectors, 
textiles, electronic products, and labor-intensive export-import sectors 
as a whole steadily increased from about 59% of total manufacturing 
employment in 1960 to about 61% of it in 1968 and to 65% in 1980. 
The major labor-intensive manufactured export sectors of Korea 
may be divided into three different groups. The first group represents 
those which were the leading export sectors in the late 1960s and early 
1970s but whose export growth rates became much lower in the late 
281 Export-Oriented Growth and Trade Patterns of Korea 
1970s. This group consists of wearing apparel, miscellaneous manu- 
factures (mostly wigs), fish products, textile fabrics (including miscel- 
laneous textile products), natural fiber yarns, and veneer and plywood. 
The second group represents those which revealed high rates of growth 
in exports only at the end of the 1970s. This group consists of footwear, 
watches and optical instruments, radios and televisions (including 
phonographs and tape recorders), metal products, and nonmetallic min- 
eral products (excluding cement). The third group represents those 
which maintained more or less the same rates of growth throughout 
the 1960s and 1970s. This group consists of electronic products, wood 
products, and leather products. Apparently, the rise and fall of various 
labor-intensive manufactured exports over time do not occur strictly 
in relation to the order of capital intensity. That is, the magnitude of 
the adverse impact inflicted by the tripling of the real wage rate during 
1968-80 does not seem to have been proportional to the capital intensity 
of the sectors. 
In the 1970s there occurred a significant shift in the composition of 
Korea’s commodity exports: the exports of capital-intensive manufac- 
tures increased significantly. Sugar refining (with e = 0.29), cement 
(with e = 0.17), fertilizer (with e = 0.29), and rubber products (with 
e = 0.53), (which are presented as capital-intensive export sectors in 
table 10.4) became important export sectors by 1980. Furthermore, 
synthetic resin, fiber and plastic materials, transport equipment, steel 
products, and iron and steel, which were heavily import-dependent 
sectors in the 1960s, became capital-intensive export-import sectors in 
the 1970s. However, their employment effect seems to have been very 
limited. The proportion of labor employed in capital-intensive export 
sectors and capital-intensive export-import sectors as a whole in- 
creased from about 7% of total manufacturing employment in 1960 to 
about 12% in 1968, but it was still 12% in 1980. 
The major capital-intensive manufactured exports of Korea may be 
divided into two groups on the basis of employment effect. The first 
group represents extremely capital-intensive manufactures which ex- 
perienced a declining share of labor absorption in spite of increasing 
exports. This group consists of synthetic resin, fiber and plastic ma- 
terials, fertilizers, sugar refining, iron and steel, cement, and petroleum 
refining. The second group represents those sectors with relatively 
lower capital intensity which consequently had significant positive em- 
ployment effects. This group consists of machinery, ships, automobiles 
and parts, rubber tires and tubes, steel products, and nonferrous metal 
products. 
The increasing exports of such capital-intensive manufactured goods 
may be explained mostly in terms of the rising relative labor costs and 
rapid capital accumulation in Korea during 1960-80. However, gov- 
Table 10.4 Sectoral Capital Intensity and Trade Patterns: Korean Manufacturing 
Sector 
Capital Intensity Export-Output Import-Domestic Labor 
(thousands of 1980 $)" Ratio ( e )  (%) Demand Ratio (m) (%) Allocation (%) 
1960 1968 1980 1960 1970 1980 1960 1970 1980 1960 1970 1980 
All primary sectors - - - 3.1 3.7 5.6 12.8 17.2 42.1 - - - 
All manufacturing sectors 4.0 5.8 10.4 2.5 13.0 19.1 18.2 23.2 20.1 100 100 100 
L-intensive exporth 2.4 2.8 4.4 5.2 35.6 43.1 10.2 4.4 5.7 23.0 27.0 28.0 
K-intensive exportC 12.8 50.1 32.3 0.6 5.4 30.2 61.5 2.8 5.1 1.7 2.7 2.1 
Textile yams and fabricsd 3.0 4.7 7.4 2.7 16.6 24.8 1.5 15.7 8.6 29.7 25.2 19.5 
Electronic productse 2.0 3.6 4.5 2.7 44.2 43.8 57.4 52.3 39.6 0.3 1.2 7.8 
L-intensive Export-import' 3.0 4.1 7.7 3.3 7.2 34.5 28.7 43.9 32.7 5.9 1.2 9.8 
K-intensive Export-irnportg 4.7 6.8 28.2 4.3 3.6 20.2 26.1 39.2 23.8 5.4 9.6 9.9 
N-intensive importh 3.4 10.9 20.8 1.8 7.4 3.6 61.0 15.4 16.6 3.5 3.3 3.7 
Chemicals 9.7 6.0 16.7 2.8 1.0 7.0 38.9 39.5 30.0 4.7 4.0 5.0 
Machinery 3.7 4.1 11.4 2.7 3.3 10.7 39.6 78.3 61.7 3.5 3.2 4.0 
Other manufacturing' 5.0 4.7 11.4 0.9 3.4 2.3 3.3 6.3 9.7 22.3 16.6 10.2 
Sources: Bank of Korea, Input-Output Tables of Korea; and Economic Planning Board, Report on Mining and Manufacturing Census. 
a1980 prices were obtained by applying the GNP deflator for gross fixed capital formation in manufacturing and the 1980 exchange rate 
of 613.4 won per dollar. Capital stock includes land. 
hFootwear, wearing apparel, miscellaneous manufactures, fish products, wood and furniture, and nonmetallic mineral products excluding 
cement. 
=Rubber products, fertilizer, cement, and refined sugar. 
dIncludes miscellaneous textile products. 
'Electronic products and communication equipment, including radios and televisions. 
Metal products, precision instruments, electrical machinery (excluding electronic products and communication equipment), and leather 
products. 
gSynthetic materials (resins, fibers, and plastic material), transport equipment, steel products, and iron and steel. 
hNonferrous metal products, pulp and paper products, and petroleum products. 
'Food products (excluding fish products and sugar), printing, and coal products. 
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ernment subsidy of capital in Korea has also played a role in this trend, 
especially in the case of increasing exports of highly capital-intensive 
goods. 
In the 1960s the export-oriented growth of Korea was possible only 
through the expansion of manufactured exports to advanced countries 
such as the United States, Japan, and the European Community. Korea’s 
exports to the newly affluent OPEC countries have recently increased 
greatly. Manufactured exports to non-OPEC developing countries 
steadily increased in the 1970s. lo Since, in general, developing-country 
import restrictions against intermediate and investment goods are not 
as severe as those against consumer goods, and since Korea has been 
transforming its output and export pattern toward such products, it is 
expected that in the future export expansion to developing countries 
may become as important as that to advanced countries. Korea has 
imported almost all its intermediate and investment goods from ad- 
vanced countries, especially from Japan, the United States, and the 
European Community. The resource-rich advanced countries such as 
Canada, Australia, and the United States have supplied most of the 
non-oil primary products to Korea. Also, Korea’s import dependency 
on non-OPEC developing countries has continuously increased, mainly 
in primary products but also in some manufactures as well.I1 
10.5 
In addition to the full-fledged administrative support for export ex- 
pansion, two major policy instruments were applied by the Korean 
government in carrying out the export-oriented growth strategy: the 
preferential tax system and the allocation of subsidies. The most im- 
portant form of government subsidy allocation was, first, to maintain 
extremely low real interest rates on bank loans by applying fixed nom- 
inal interest rates along with high rates of inflation through expansion- 
ary monetary policy and, second, to ration these low real-interest-rate 
loans to preferred sectors for export expansion. 
Total loans provided through the deposit money banks (DMB), Ko- 
rea Development Bank (KDB), and Korea Export-Import Bank 
(EXIMB) have steadily increased from a magnitude equivalent to about 
15% of GNP in 1962-66 to about 32% in 1967-71, to about 39% in 
1972-76, and to about 46% of GNP in 1977-81.12 
During 1962-66, EXIMB did not exist, but KDB alone provided 
more than one-third of total loans in the form of discretionary policy 
loans. During 1967-76 KDB and EXIMB provided only about 15% of 
total loans, but as a result of the rapidly expanding EXIMB activities 
since the late 1970s, their share in total loans expanded to about 18% 
during 1977-81. Discretionary policy loans provided through DMB (in 
Credit Rationing at Low Real Interest Rates 
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the form of the machine industry promotion fund, the term loan fund, 
the medium industry fund, the export industry equipment fund, and 
the foreign currency loan fund, etc.) increased from about 10% of total 
loans in 1962-66 to about 20% in 1967-81. Therefore, the magnitude 
of loans formally designated as discretionary policy loans amounted to 
around 36% of total loans during 1967-81. 
Short-term export credits and loans for agriculture, fisheries, and 
housing may be classified as nondiscretionary policy loans. These loans 
composed about 17% of total loans during 1967-81. Thus, formal policy 
loans slightly exceeded half of total loans (provided through DMB, 
KDB, and EXIMB) during 1967-81. However, discounted commercial 
bills and loans based on general banking funds were also rationed at 
the discretion of the government in Korea, and hence, these loans 
should be regarded as nonpolicy but discretionary loans. The number 
of such loans declined from about 30% of total loans in 1967-71 to 
about 20% in 1977-81. 
Overdraft, loans based on installment savings deposits, personal 
loans, remunerations (Citizens National Bank loans based on install- 
ment savings deposits), and loans by branches of foreign banks may 
be regarded as nonpolicy loans free of government discretion, though 
they may still have been subject to favoritism and political influence. 
These nondiscretionary nonpolicy DMB loans amounted to around 22% 
of total loans during 1972-81.13 
The real interest rate (i.e., difference between nominal interest rate 
and the rate of change in GNP deflator) on one-year time deposits 
amounted to about -10.7% per annum on the average in 1954-64, 
10.0% per annum during the high-interest-rate era of 1965-71, and 
-3.4% per annum in 1972-81. The real interest rate applied to dis- 
counts of commercial bills amounted to -7.3% per annum on the 
average in 1954-64,9.5% per annum in 1965-71, and - 1.7% per annum 
in 1972-81 .I4 If we estimate the real interest rates on all loans provided 
by all banking institutions in Korea by using the real interest rates 
applied to discounts of commercial bills (since the real rate of return 
on capital in manufacturing amounted to around 23% per annum on 
the average during 1972-79; as shown in table lO.l), the rate of the 
subsidy element associated with rationed low-interest loans in Korea 
seems to have amounted to about 24% per annum on the average during 
The weighted-average real interest rate on foreign loans amounted 
to 2.1% per annum during 1967-71 and - 7.4% per annum during 1972- 
76 on the average (Hong 1979,201). During 1977-79 Korea maintained 
a fixed exchange rate (at 484 won per dollar) in spite of the fact that 
domestic prices were rising at about 1% per annum, while the (weighted 
average) price level of its major trade partners (i.e., the United States 
1972-81. l5 
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and Japan) was rising at about 6% per annum (applying equal weights 
to both countries). Since the Euro-dollar interest rates amounted to 
about 11% per annum during 1977-79 on average, the real interest rates 
on Korea’s foreign borrowing could not have exceeded -2% during 
1977-79.16 Therefore, there seems to have been as much of a subsidy 
element associated with foreign borrowing as there was with domestic 
bank loans. Naturally, the allocation of foreign borrowing has also been 
strictly controlled by the government. 
The total volume of domestic loans provided through DMB, KDB, 
and EXIMB amounted to about 39% of GNP in 1972-76 and about 
46% of GNP in 1977-81. On the other hand, the estimated average real 
rates of return on investment in the Korean manufacturing sector 
amounted to around 22% in the 1970s. If we take the difference between 
the real rate of return on investment and the real interest rate as the 
subsidy rate associated with domestic bank loan allocations (which 
exceeded 24% per annum), the annual provision of credit subsidies in 
Korea amounted to at least 10% of GNP each year on average in the 
1970s.” At 10% of GNP, the domestic credit subsidy must be judged 
large enough to significantly affect the pattern of Korea’s output and 
trade. Furthermore, there were also low-interest-rate foreign loans 
amounting to about 6% of GNP each year on average in the 1970s that 
were allocated directly to entrepreneurs. Indeed, the rationing of do- 
mestic and foreign loans provided the largest source of rents in Korea, 
helping to worsen the distribution of income in the 1970s (see Hong 
1981). 
We have so far ignored the nonmonetary financial markets. In Korea, 
a business group which gets preferential treatment in bank loan ra- 
tioning either directly controls (owns) a significant portion of a non- 
monetary financial institution or gets preferential treatment from them. 
The political and economic significance of getting preferential treatment 
in credit rationing in the highly regulated Korean economy is the vastly 
reduced possibility of bankruptcy in the eyes of lenders not only in 
nonmonetary financial markets but also in unorganized money markets. 
Hence, the size of bank loans rationed to a firm itself leads to substantial 
additional benefits from nonbank financial markets. 
10.6 Manufacturing Output and Export with Factor Market 
Distortions 
According to Krueger (1977), factor market distortions in the form 
of lower rental-wage rates applied to capital-intensive manufacturing 
sectors would result in production (and exports) of excessively capital- 
intensive manufactures. Furthermore, the lower rental-wage rates that 
would result for labor-intensive manufacturing sectors would make 
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very labor-intensive sectors become profitable with excessively labor- 
intensive techniques of production. As a result, we would expect to 
observe more significant disparities in capital intensities among man- 
ufacturing sectors (as well as manufactured exports) of a country with 
substantial factor market distortions than in those of a country with 
moderate distortions in factor markets. If the government allocates 
subsidized loans to each manufacturing sector in proportion to sectoral 
value added, then the rates of subsidy (in the form of low rental price 
for capital service) provided per unit of each manufacturing activity 
will be identical. However, if the more capital-intensive sectors are 
allocated a larger proportion of subsidized credits per value added, 
then the rates of subsidy provided for these production activities will 
be higher than those for labor-intensive production activities. For in- 
stance, subsidized credits allocated in proportion to sectoral capital 
use rather than in proportion to sectoral value added will raise the 
relative rates of subsidies for capital-intensive sectors. This will be 
conducive to both output expansion and factor substitution toward 
more capital-intensive techniques of production in capital-intensive 
sectors. 
In order to see what manufacturing sectors in Korea received more 
than proportionate amounts of subsidized loans per unit of value added, 
the ratio of year-end balances of outstanding (domestic and foreign) 
bank loans to value added of each manufacturing sector was computed 
(table 10.5). The “L-intensive I” group of labor-intensive manufac- 
turing export sectors, consisting of clothing and footwear (including 
leather products), food products, textiles, and metal products, received 
subsidized bank loans much below the manufacturing average through- 
out the 1970s. The “L-intensive 11” group of labor-intensive manufac- 
turing sectors, consisting of miscellaneous manufactures (including pre- 
cision instruments, telecommunications equipment, furniture, pottery, 
clay, and other miscellaneous nonmetallic mineral products) and wood 
products, received an above-average rate of subsidized loan allocations 
in the 1970s. In 1968 the shares of both groups in total manufacturing 
value added and exports were very similar (table 10.6). However, while 
the share of the L-intensive I group in manufacturing value added and 
exports expanded substantially during 1968-80, the share of the L- 
intensive I1 group declined significantly. In spite of the very unfavorable 
loan allocation, the L-intensive I group was the leading labor-intensive 
manufacturing export sector of Korea in the 197Os.l8 
In 1968 none of the capital-intensive manufacturing sectors contrib- 
uted significantly to exports. In a relative sense, the K-intensive I11 
group (consisting of cement, fertilizers, and petroleum products) con- 
tributed most to the exports in 1968. However, the K-intensive I group, 
consisting of basic chemicals (including refined sugar and synthetic 
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Table 10.5 Sedoral LoanNalue-Added Ratios for Korean Manufacturing 
Ratio of Year-end 
Domestic Loan Balance 
to Value Added 
Ratio of Year-end 
Total Loan Balance 
to Value Added 
1971 1976 1981 1971 1976 1981 
L-intensive I 1.4 0.8 0.8 1.7 0.9 0.8 
L-intensive I1 2.2 1.6 1.2 3.1 2.0 1.6 
K-intensive I 2.1 1.1 1.4 3.0 1.7 1.7 
K-intensive I1 2.4 1.5 1.4 4.7 3.2 2.7 
K-intensive 111 0.9 0.6 1.2 4.3 1.5 2.0 
All manufacturing 1.5 1.1 1.1 2.5 1.6 1.5 
Source: Table 10.A.5. 
Note: “L-Intensive I” consists of clothing and footwear (including leather products), food 
products (excluding sugar refining), textiles, and metal products; “L-Intensive 11” includes 
miscellaneous manufactures (including precision instruments), wood products, telecommuni- 
cations equipment, and nonmetallic mineral products (excluding cement); “K-Intensive I” 
consists of basic industrial chemicals (including synthetic materials and sugar refining), electrical 
and nonelectrical machinery and equipment, and transport equipment; “K-Intensive 11” con- 
sists of steel products, nonferrous metal products, and iron and steel; “K-Intensive 111” consists 
of cement, fertilizers, and petroleum products. 
fiber, resin, and plastic materials), electrical and nonelectrical machin- 
ery, and transport equipment), and the K-intensive I1 group, consisting 
of steel products, iron and steel, and nonferrous metal products, con- 
tributed most to the expansion of capital-intensive manufactured ex- 
ports in the 1970s. Indeed, these two groups constituted the leading 
capital-intensive manufacturing sectors of Korea in the 1970s. On the 
other hand, the share of the K-intensive I11 group in total manufactured 
exports increased only slightly, while its shares in outputs and em- 
ployment were significantly reduced. All the capital-intensive manu- 
facturing sectors received very large amounts of subsidized loan al- 
locations in the 1970s, but the K-intensive I1 group (especially the iron 
and steel sector) received the largest amount of subsidized loan allo- 
cations per value added and achieved the most rapid expansion in 
shares of exports and outputs during 1968-80. 
Assuming a constant rental price for capital service, we estimated 
the sectoral point elasticities of capital-labor substitution (i.e., the ratio 
of average annual percentage change in capital intensity to average 
annual percentage change in real wages) during 1968-80 in each man- 
ufacturing sector (see also table 10.A.2). A high estimated elasticity 
may imply both the high substitutability between capital and labor in 
the sector and the decrease in actual rental price for capital service, 
contrary to our assumption of constant rental price during 1968-80. 
Because of aggregation, however, the capital-labor substitution within 
Table 10.6 Shifts in the Pattern of Specialization and Capital Intensity of Korean Manufacturing 
Share in Total 
Manufactured Composition of Sectoral Labor Import-Domestic 
Exports (%) Value Added (%) Allocation (%) Demand Ratio (%) 
1968 1980 1968 1980 1968 1980 1968 I980 
L-intensive I 43.0 51.3 20.9 31.7 34.8 46.0 8.4 14.3 
L-intensive I1 46.1 11.2 19.3 14.8 29.1 21.8 13.8 8.4 
K-intensive I 2.7 14.1 14.1 16.6 12.6 14.6 42.5 39.7 
K-intensive I1 1.5 11.0 3.8 7.8 3.9 4.5 26.1 22.8 
K-intensive 111 3.4 4.4 11.5 7.3 2.1 1.1.1 16.1 10.5 
All manufacturing 100 loo 100 100 100 loo 17.0 19.7 
Export-Output Capital Intensity Wage Rate 
Ratio (%) (thousands of 1980 $) (thousands of 1980 $) Point Elasticity 
of Substitution 
1968 1980 1968 1980 1968 1980 1%8-80 
L-intensive I 15.6 26.8 3.00 4.91 0.65 2.39 0.39 
L-intensive I1 24.1 22.5 4.79 7.61 0.69 2.39 0.36 
K-intensive I 2.0 15.8 6.84 17.87 0.97 3.59 0.74 
K-intensive I1 3.4 21.0 5.33 40.08 0.99 3.85 1.54 
K-intensive 111 5.4 6.7 68.65 64.60 1.90 5.71 -0.05 
All manufacturing 10.8 19.2 5.79 10.37 0.83 2.81 0.48 
Sources: Bank of Korea, Input-Output Tables of Korea; and Economic Planning Board, Report of Mining and Manufacturing Census. 
Note: 1980 prices were obtained by applying the GNP deflators for gross fixed capital formation and value added in manufacturing and the exchange 
rate of 613.4 won per dollar. Fixed capital includes land. 
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a sector might well imply mainly the introduction of new capital-intensive 
commodities rather than factor substitutions in existing lines of pro- 
duction in each sector. 
The K-intensive I1 group of sectors revealed the highest point elas- 
ticity of substitution.19 The share of this group in total manufacturing 
value added more than doubled, its share in total manufactured exports 
increased over sevenfold, and its average export-output ratio increased 
over sixfold during 1968-80. The K-intensive I group of sectors re- 
vealed the second-highest point elasticity of substitution. The share of 
this group in total manufacturing value added increased only moder- 
ately, but its export-output ratio increased nearly eightfold, and its 
share in total manufactured exports increased more than fivefold during 
1968-80. Therefore, in terms of the rate of increase in absolute amounts 
of exports as well as export-output ratios, these two groups represent 
the leading export sectors of Korea in the 1970s. The high value of 
estimated elasticities for these groups may mostly reflect the lower 
rental price for capital service in these sectors resulting from the fa- 
vorable credit rationing. 
On the other hand, the K-intensive I11 group of sectors revealed the 
lowest elasticity, a substantial decline of shares in total manufacturing 
value added, and a slight increase in export-output ratio. The low 
estimated value of elasticity may reflect the facts that the capital in- 
tensity of this group was extremely high already by 1968, and hence 
there existed only a limited possibility for further factor substitutions, 
and also the sectors in this group were fairly narrowly defined and 
consequently there was not much room for the introduction of new 
commodities in any significant scale within these sectors.20 
As can be observed in table 10.A.2, the real wage rates have also 
been rising in every labor-intensive manufacturing sector, and the re- 
sponse of each labor-intensive sector (in terms of capital intensity) to 
rising labor costs seems to have been more or less uniform, and the 
estimated elasticities were quite close to the manufacturing average as 
a whole. On the other hand, there have been wide disparities in the 
rates of increase in capital intensities of capital-intensive sectors.21 
10.7 Intensity of Capital Market Distortions and the Trade Pattern 
Among the four Asian advanced developing countries, Korea and 
Hong Kong seem to reflect opposite extremes in capital-market dis- 
tortions and credit rationing in favor of capital-intensive manufacturing 
sectors. Taiwan and Singapore seem to fall somewhere between Korea 
and Hong Kong. Hence, one may expect Korea to have exported the 
largest amount of capital-intensive manufactures among the four coun- 
tries, and Hong Kong the smallest. In 1980 commodity exports of these 
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countries amounted to $13 4 2 0  billion. Indeed, the capital-intensive 
goods (excluding petroleum products) exported by Korea amounted to 
about $4.1 billion, those by Taiwan about $3.4 billion, those by Singa- 
pore about $1.5 billion, and those by Hong Kong only about $1.4 
billion.22 Including petroleum products, the capital-intensive manufac- 
tures exported by Singapore amounted to about $6.9 billion, those by 
Korea $4.1 billion, those by Taiwan $3.7 billion, and those by Hong 
Kong $1.4 billion. The Singapore economy in the 1970s, which had the 
highest per capita income among the four, may be characterized by a 
semiinfinite supply of capital (owing to the Singapore dollar market 
and relatively high domestic savings) and low rates of growth in labor 
supply.23 The Hong Kong economy may also be characterized by the 
relatively abundant supply of capital (owing to the Hong Kong dollar 
market) but has maintained relatively high rates of growth in labor 
supply (owing to its proximity to mainland China). Taiwan has main- 
tained a more rapid growth of domestic capital supply than Korea 
because of higher domestic savings. Korea, which had the lowest per 
capita income and the lowest propensity to save among the four, ex- 
ported the largest amount of capital-intensive manufactures, excluding 
petroleum products. If petroleum products are included, then Korea 
exported the second-largest amount of capital-intensive manufactures. 
This might well be explained by the significant capital market distor- 
tions in favor of capital-intensive sectors in Korea during the 1970s. 
Compared with Korea, Taiwan has maintained fairly high rates of 
real interest on bank deposits and loans and hence seems to have 
suffered less from the adverse effects of arbitrary credit rationing. In 
Korea, the real interest rate on one-year time deposits amounted to 
10.0% per annum on average during the high-interest-rate era of 1965- 
71. However, it amounted to - 10.7% per annum on average in 1954- 
64 and -4.0% per annum in 1972-79, while in Taiwan it amounted to 
about 10.7% per annum in 1953-60, 6.4% in 1961-70, and 0.3% in 
1971-79. In Korea, the real rate of interest applied to the discount of 
nonpreferential commercial bills amounted to about 9.5% per annum 
on average during 1965-71, but it amounted to only about -7.3% per 
annum in 1954-64 and - 2.6% in 1972-79, while in Taiwan it amounted 
to about 10.4% per annum on average in 1953-60, 9.4% in 1961-70, 
and 2.3% in 1971-79. That is, except for the so-called high-interest- 
rate period of 1965-71 in Korea, real rates of interest on bank deposits 
and loans in Taiwan were on average higher than those in Korea by 
4% or more.24 
If we compare the sectoral export performance of Korea and Taiwan 
in 1981 (see table 10.7). Taiwan’s exports of such labor-intensive man- 
ufactures as wood and furniture products and miscellaneous manufac- 
tures were about 2.4 times larger than those of Korea (i.e., $5.5 billion 
Table 10.7 Sectoral Export Performance in 1981: Korea and Taiwan 
Exports Capital Intensitya Wage Ratea 
(billions of dollars) (thousands of 1981 $) (thousands of 1981 $) 
Korea (A) Taiwan (B) N B  Korea (1981) Taiwan (1976) Korea (1981) Taiwan (1976) 
Miscellaneous manufacturesb 
Wood products 
Electronic and Telecommunications 
equipment 
Metal products 
Clothing and footwear 
Textiles, natural' 
Textiles, synthetic 
Steel products 
Transport equipment 
Rubber products 
Basic chemicals 
Sugar refining 
Fertilizers 
Cement 
Nonferrous metal products 
Iron and steel 
Machinery 
Petroleum products 
All manufacturing 
1.7 
0.5 
1.8 
1.1 
4.9 
1.3 
1.2 
1.4 
2.0 
0.5 
0.36 
0.2 
0.2 
0.34 
0.1 
0.4 
0.9 
0.1 
21.0 
4.3 
1.2 
2.8 
1 .o 
4.4 
1.2 
0.9 
0.4 
0.8 
0.2 
0.3 
0.02 
0.0 
0.07 
0.04 
0.05 
2.2 
0.4 
22.5 
0.41 
0.42 
0.65 
1.09 
1.12 
1.09 
1.36 
3.71 
2.39 
2.82 
1.19 
10.04 
94.00 
5.21 
2.44 
7.37 
0.42 
0.32 
0.93 
7.0 
9.0 
5.6 
8.3 
2.3 
7.9 
9.6 
17.4 
20.6 
12.6 
53.1 
66.1 
48.2 
69.4 
28.6 
75.5 
13.5 
113.1 
11.7 
5.6 
6.4 
5.3 
5.8 
4.0 
8.8 
29.7 
10.6 
20.9 
7.3 
55.5 
29.0 
64.2 
101.2 
35.7 
154.0 
11.2 
118.3 
12.0 
2.7 
2.6 
2.8 
3.1 
2.1 
2.4 
2.5 
3.6 
4.3 
3.7 
4.7 
5.4 
5.8 
5.5 
3.8 
4.5 
3.3 
8.4 
3.0 
1.9 
2.0 
2.2 
2.0 
1.8 
2.0 
2.5 
2.7 
2.4 
2.3 
3.3 
4.6 
4.3 
5.1 
2.8 
3.4 
2.4 
4.3 
2.2 
Sources: Korean Traders Association, Foreign Trade Statistics; and Inspectorate General of Customs, Taiwan, The Trade of China (Taiwan Disfrict). 
a1981 prices for Taiwan were obtained by applying the wholesale price index for all commodities (158.42) and the WPI for capital goods (143.35) with 
1976 as base year and the exchange rate of NT $36.8 per dollar. (The exchange rate of 682.7 won per dollar was applied to Korea.) 
bhcluding nonmetallic mineral products (except cement), precision instruments, and plastic products. 
CIncluding natural fiber yarns and fabrics and other textile products except synthetic fiber yarns and fabrics. 
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versus $2.2 billion), and Taiwan’s exports of electronic and telecom- 
munications equipment were about 55% larger than those of Korea 
(i.e., $2.8 billion versus $1.8 billion). On the other hand, Korea’s ex- 
ports of such capital-intensive manufactures as steel products were 
about 3.7 times larger than those of Taiwan (i.e., $1.4 billion versus 
$0.4 billion) and its exports of transport equipment (including ships and 
containers) amounted to about 2.4 times those of Taiwan (Le., $2.0 
billion versus $0.8 billion). Furthermore, the exports of such capital- 
intensive manufactures as rubber products, basic industrial chemicals 
(including synthetic resin, fiber, and plastic materials), fertilizers, ce- 
ment, refined sugar, nonferrous metal products, and iron and steel 
amounted to about $2.1 billion in Korea but only about $0.7 billion in 
Taiwan. 
One might regard the case of machinery as an exception because, 
while the machinery sector was relatively capital intensive in Korea, 
Korea’s exports of machinery in 1981 amounted to only about 43% of 
those of Taiwan. In 1981 Taiwan’s exports of electric motors and gen- 
erators, sewing machines, machine tools for particular industries, air 
pumps and gas compressors , lifting and loading machinery, electrical 
equipment for internal combustion engines, electromechanical domes- 
tic appliances with motors, apparatus for making or breaking electric 
circuits, and calculating and other office machines and parts amounted 
to about $1.1 billion, while Korea’s exports of these items amounted 
to only about $0.25 billion (see table 10.A.7). In Korea the average 
capital intensity of these sectors amounted to about $9.2 thousand per 
worker, while that of the other electrical and nonelectrical machinery 
sectors amounted to about $16 thousand per worker. That is, although 
Taiwan’s exports of electrical and nonelectrical machinery as a whole 
($2.2 billion) were only 2.4 times larger than those of Korea in 1981 
($0.9 billion), Taiwan’s exports of relatively labor-intensive machinery 
and equipment were as much as 4.6 times larger than those of Korea 
in 1981. After all, the machinery sector in Taiwan could be classified 
as relatively labor-intensive, while the machinery sector in Korea (ex- 
cluding electronic and telecommunications equipment) had to be clas- 
sified as relatively capital-inten~ive.~’ 
10.8 Concluding Remarks 
In Korea, the efficiency gains associated with the long process of 
the opening up of a semiautarkic economy to semifree trade have ma- 
terialized not only in the form of rapidly rising real wage rates but also 
in the form of high rates of return on investment. These enhanced rates 
of return in turn seem to have kindled the “animal spirit” of Korean 
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entrepreneurs and generated a vigorous pace of investment activities 
in Korea during the past twenty-year period. By the beginning of the 
1980s, however, exports as a percentage of GNP already exceeded 
40%. As of 1981, the raw materials and intermediate inputs imported 
for “direct” use in export production amounted to about 29% of total 
commodity imports. Hence, there is still substantial room to increase 
the net value-added content of exports even while maintaining the same 
export share of GNP. However, the large efficiency gains associated 
with the initial phase of the opening up of trade must now be more or 
less exhausted. In this sense, Korea might have to worry about the 
sagging animal spirit of entrepreneurs and the weakening vigor of their 
investment activities in the 1980s. However, with the vast amount of 
positive experience and kinetic energy accumulated during the past 
two decades, the gains from marginal structural adjustment can be 
amplified, as has been observed in Japan. To accomplish this, however, 
Korea may have to pay more attention to “marginal” efficiency and 
to the market mechanism in general. 
Because of the increase in real wages in Korea and the worsening 
protectionist policies of advanced countries against labor-intensive 
manufactures, Korea does not have any alternative but to keep un- 
dertaking structural transformation of its production and exports to- 
ward the more skill- and technology-intensive and the somewhat more 
capital-intensive manufacturing sectors. The system of negative real 
interest rates, subsidies, and credit allocations has been maintained as 
one of the important policy instruments to promote export-oriented 
growth in Korea. The most serious problems associated with this “re- 
pressed” financial regime have been the slower growth in the magnitude 
of loanable funds of formal financial institutions and the increasing 
probability of inefficient and wasteful allocation of available investment 
funds. There was a rapid increase in aggregate savings propensity in 
Korea during 1962-81, and yet the savings/GNP ratio (especially the 
level of household savings) achieved by Korea is far below those 
achieved by Taiwan, Singapore, and Japan. The reason for this gap is 
often attributed to the repressed financial regime. 
The mismanagement of credit rationing in favor of the arbitrarily 
selected heavy industries was most conspicuous in the late 1970s and 
is believed to have lowered the overall productivity of Korean indus- 
tries. The notorious failures in Korea were the investments in nonfer- 
rous metal manufacturing, large petrochemical complexes, large fer- 
tilizer plants, capital-intensive armament factories, and a gigantic 
heavy-machine factory. The low rates of growth in industrial produc- 
tivity, GNP, and commodity exports experienced by Korea since the 
beginning of the 1980s may readily be attributed to the second oil crisis, 
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worldwide recession, and the prevailing high interest rates in inter- 
national financial markets. However, the arbitrary system of credit 
rationing may also have to share some of the responsibility. 
Furthermore, credit rationing seems also to have been, at least partly, 
responsible for the worsening distribution of income in Korea (see Hong 
1981). Credit rationing has been concentrated on large company groups, 
and as a result, there occurred a concentration of export activities. In 
the beginning of the 1970s, the share of exports from the nine general- 
trading-company groups in Korea’s total commodity exports amounted 
to only about 15%. By the early 1980s, however, these nine groups 
exported nearly half of the total of commodity exports.26 Their ex- 
panding share in the 1970s was at the expense of the share of small- 
and medium-sized exporting firms.27 
Considering the equity and efficiency aspects of credit rationing, one 
may be able to conclude that it is time for the Korean government to 
start reducing the excessiveness of credit rationing by enhancing the 
role of the market mechanism in resource allocation. If the governments 
succeeds in maintaining the past trend of an increasing propensity to 
save and in eliminating excessive distortions in factor and commodity 
markets, Korea will be able to improve the efficiency of its export- 
oriented economy and consequently will be able to maintain high rates 
of growth in the 1980s and thereafter. 
Table 10.A.l Output and Trade Patterns of Korean Manufacturing 
Value Added Exports Imports 
(Wage Share) output (Export-Output Ratio) (Import Dependency) 
1968 1980 1968 1980 1968 1980 1968 1980 
Clothing and footwear 
Food products 
Electronic products 
Metal products 
Miscellaneous manufactures 
Textiles 
Wood products 
Basic chemicals 
Machinery 
Transport equipment 
Steel products 
Nonferrous metal products 
Iron and steel 
Cement 
Fertilizers 
Petroleum products 
Rubber products 
Other products 
All manufacturing 
156(37.2) 
151 (25.2) 
25(40.0) 
M(34.4) 
156(35.9) 
404(34.4) 
106(24.5) 
119(13.5) 
12q32.5) 
128(32.8) 
34(29.4) 
13(38.5) 
82( 12.2) 
114(15.8) 
107(3.7) 
23(26.1) 
822( 19.3) 
2,642(25.6) 
54(3 1.5) 
1,601(40.6) 
1,383(26.7) 
1,034(37.6) 
629(40.4) 
1,480(37.2) 
2,623(35.5) 
237(51.1) 
904( 17.6) 
1,170(38.0) 
1,141(39.7) 
325(29.5) 
262(27.5) 
920( 19.3) 
452( 12.4) 
212(17.0) 
749(4.1) 
244(34.4) 
3,965(19.8) 
19,329(29.3) 
756 
1,408 
118 
142 
553 
1,541 
395 
34 1 
453 
585 
287 
58 
91 
166 
108 
35 1 
58 
2,110 
9,404 
6,709 
12,015 
3,835 
1,918 
3,529 
6,157 
1,272 
6,556 
3,99 1 
2,729 
3,987 
937 
2,886 
1,356 
1,098 
7,388 
877 
10,637 
77,877 
187(24.7) 
106(7.5) 
32(27.1) 
16( 11.3) 
95(17.2) 
309(20.1) 
158(40.0) 
S(1.5) 
18(4.0) 
4(0.7) 
4(1.4) 
1 l(19.0) 
O(O.0) 
13(7.8) 
4(3.7) 
17(4.8) 
4(6.9) 
33(1.6) 
1,014(10.8) 
3,615(53.9) 
295(2.5) 
1,678(43.8) 
877(45.7) 
1,193(33.8) 
1,237(20.1) 
431(33.9) 
769( 1 1.7) 
524( 13. I )  
805 (29.5) 
1,214(30.4) 
11 l(11.9) 
31 l(10.8) 
23 1 (1 7.0) 
321(29.2) 
106(1.4) 
464(52.9) 
757(7.1) 
14,939( 19.2) 
7( 1.2) 
83(6.0) 
27(23.9) 
76(24.3) 
39(7.9) 
161(11.6) 
76(24.3) 
228(40.4) 
41 8(49.0) 
355(37.9) 
10 l(26.3) 
30(39.0) 
18(24.7) 
7(4.4) 
75(4 I .9) 
31(8.5) 
2(3.6) 
95(4.4) 
1,7 18( 17 .O) 
289(8.5) 
752(6.0) 
1,416(39.6) 
275(20.9) 
648(21.7) 
484(9.0) 
42(4.8) 
2,178(27.4) 
3,758(52.0) 
1,424(42.4) 
537( 16.2) 
476(36.3) 
813(24.0) 
2(0.2) 
52(6.3) 
1,022(12.3) 
47( 10.2) 
1,231(11. I )  
15,441 (1 9.7) 
Sources: Bank of Korea, Input-Ourpur Tables of Korea (for output and trade data); and Economic Planning Board, Report on Mining and 
Manufacturing Census (for value-added and wage-share data). See also notes for table 10.3. 
Note: Numbers are millions of 1980 dollars. 
Table 10.A.2 Shifts in Wage Rates and Capital Intensity of Korean Manufacturing 
~~ 
Capital Wages Number of Workers 
(Capital-Labor Ratiop (Per Worker Wage Ratep (Labor Allocation)b Point Elasticity 
of Substitution 
1968 1980 1968 1980 1968 1980 1968-80 
Clothing and footwear 17q2.26) 
Food products 258(4.26) 
Electronic products 32(3.60) 
Metal products lOO(3.52) 
Miscellaneous manufactures 219(2.54) 
Textiles 875(4.71) 
Wood products 168(5.37) 
Basic chemicals 247( 17.17) 
Machinery 185(4.30) 
Transport equipment 211(5.73) 
Steel products 45(5.65) 
Nonferrous metal products 2q6.52) 
Iron and steel 83(4.90) 
Cement 577(85.84) 
Fertilizers 381(60.11) 
Petroleum products 107(43 32) 
Rubber products 21(3.75) 
Other products 603(5.09) 
All manufacturing 4,337(5.79) 
682(2.12) 
1,219(8.91) 
710(4.60) 
645(7.24) 
1,287(5.73) 
2,923(7.44) 
423(9.16) 
1,775(45.95) 
1,573(11.22) 
1,918( 16.56) 
445(16.70) 
436(25.53) 
2,621(62.07) 
683(63.49) 
306(51.35) 
403(83.45) 
302( 12.38) 
2,291(11.44) 
20,898( 10.37) 
53(0.71) 
35(0.58) 
9( 1.03) 
20(0.71) 
52(0.60) 
128(0.69) 
24(0.76) 
15( 1.02) 
38(0.87) 
39( 1.05) 
9( 1.16) 
5( 1.18) 
16(0.92) 
9(1.37) 
17(2.61) 
4( 1 S O )  
6(0.97) 
138(1.17) 
62 l(0.83) 
650(2.02) 
369(2.70) 
389(2.52) 
254(2.85) 
55 l(2.45) 
93 l(2.37) 
121(2.62) 
159(4.12) 
445(3.17) 
453(3.91) 
96(3.60) 
72(3.43) 
178(4.22) 
56U.21) 
36(6.05) 
31(6.42) 
84(3.44) 
72 l(3.60) 
5,660(2.81) 
75.4(10.1) 
60.6(8.1) 
8.9U.2) 
28.6(3.8) 
86.9( 11.6) 
186.4(24.9) 
31.4(4.2) 
14.4(1.9) 
43.168) 
36.8(4.9) 
7.9( 1.1) 
3.9(0.5) 
17.0(2.3) 
6.7(0.9) 
6.3(0.9) 
2.5(0.3) 
5.7(0.8) 
118.6(15.9) 
748.3( 100) 
321.3(16.0) -0.06 
136.8(6.8) 0.48 
154.4(7.7) 0.25 
89.1(4.4) 0.48 
224.6(11.2) 0.56 
392.8(19.5) 0.36 
46.2(2.3) 0.41 
38.6(1.9) 0.68 
140.2(7 .O) 0.74 
115.8(5.8) 0.78 
26.7(1.3) 0.95 
21.0( 1 .O) 1.26 
42.2(2.1) 1.78 
10.8(0.5) -0.21 
6.q0.3) - 0.18 
4.8(0.2) 0.42 
24.4(1.2) 0.91 
200.3(9.9) 0.70 
2,014.8(100) 0.48 
Source: Economic Planning Board, Report on Mining and Manufacturing Census. 
aIn thousands of 1980 dollars. See notes for table 10.3. Fixed capital includes land 
thousands of persons. 
Table 10.A.3 The Composition of Bank Loans in Korea (in billions won and percentages) 
Nondiscretionary Nondiscretionary Discretionary 
Nonpolicy DMB Loansa DMB Policy Loans Policy Loans Total 
Domestic Foreign Nonpolicy Export DMB EXIMB (DMB, KDB, and 
Banks Banks DMB Loansb Credit Othersc Loansd and KDBe EXIMB) 
Discretionary Loans 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1%6 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1(2) 
5(8) 
8(10) 
14(12) 
28(18) 
43(17) 
84(18) 
158(20) 
194(20) 
224(18) 
244(16) 
383( 19) 
573(19) 
820(21) 
976(20) 
ll(21) 
15(22) 
15(20) 
16(19) 
26(24) 
38(25) 
70(27) 
146(32) 
246(3 1) 
296(31) 
398(32) 
40 l(26) 
475(23) 
829(27) 
893(23) 
1,025(21) 
14(26) 
14(20) 
15(20) 
16(19) 
17(16) 
20( 14) 
30(11) 
49(11) 
79(9) 
1 10( 1 2) 
130(11) 
160( 10) 
186(9) 
241(8) 
291(8) 
391(8) 
5(10) 
8(11) 
lO(12) 
ll(10) 
W8) 
49(19) 
80( 18) 
180(23) 
157( 16) 
227( 18) 
358(23) 
4 19(2 1) 
549( 18) 
774(20) 
1,033(21) 
7 ~ 1 )  
20(39) 
24(36) 
28(36) 
32(37) 
37(34) 
47(3 1) 
52(20) 
w 15) 
96( 12) 
129( 14) 
158( 13) 
239(16) 
319(16) 
426(14) 
608(16) 
796( 16) 
52(100) 
68(100) 
77(100) 
85(100) 
109(100) 
150( 100) 
261(100) 
452(100) 
798(100) 
953(100) 
1,234(100) 
1,540( 100) 
2,034(100) 
3,048(100) 
3,857( 100) 
4,867( 100) 
Table 10.A.3 (continued) 
Nondiscretionary Nondiscretionary Discretionary 
Nonpolicy DMB Loansa DMB Policy Loans Policy Loans Total 
Domestic Foreign Nonpolicy Export DMB EXIMB (DMB, KDB, and 
Banks Banks DMB Loansb Credit OthersC Loansd and KDBe EXIMB) 
Discretionary Loans 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1962 - 66 
1967-71 
1977 -8 1 
1972-76 
1,073( 17) 
1,433( 15) 
2,272( 17) 
2,654( 14) 
3,025(13) 
3,777(13) 
11.6% 
18.6% 
19.0% 
15.2% 
409(7) 
685(7) 
943(7) 
1,953( 11) 
2,236(9) 
2,684(9) 
- 
0.8% 
2.8% 
8.2% 
1,348(21) 
1,995(21) 
2,620(20) 
3,635(20) 
5,007(21) 
6,805(23) 
22.0% 
30.6% 
24.0% 
20.6% 
567(9) 
883(9) 
1,126(9) 
1,721(9) 
2,197(9) 
2,278(8) 
3.2% 
5.4% 
9.6% 
9.0% 
17.8% 
10.8% 
8.6% 
8.6% 
1,189( 19) 
1,948(21) 
2,513(19) 
3,192( 17) 
4,466( 19) 
5,397(18) 
10.4% 
18.8% 
20.6% 
19.0% 
1,129( 18) 
1,608(17) 
2,364( 18) 
3,617(18) 
4,773(20) 
6,234(2 1 ) 
34.8% 
14.8% 
15.6% 
18.2% 
6,345( 100) 
9,316( 100) 
13,064(100) 
18,417(100) 
23,503( 100) 
29,619( 100) 
100.0% 
100.0% 
100.0% 
100.0% 
Source: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, various issues. 
aConsists of overdrafts, loans based on installment savings deposits, personal loans, remunerations (Citizens National Bank loans based 
on mutual installment funds), and loans by the branches of foreign banks (including foreign currency loans). 
bConsists of discounted commercial bills and loans of general funds. 
CConsists of loans for agriculture, fisheries, and housing with banking funds and government funds. 
dIncludes foreign currency loans by domestic DMBs. Foreign currency loans include a small amount of import usage (around 5%). The 
non-foreign currency loans are for specified projects. 
‘Includes foreign currency loans. 
Table 10.A.4 Money Supply and Domestic Credit in Korea 
Reserve Domestic Domestic Loans by KDB, 
Money MI M2 M, Credit 1 Credit2a EXIMB, DMB 
Average Annual Growth Rates (percentages) 
- - - - 1953-61 35.4 51.6 - 
1962-66 48.4 19.4 32.3 - 28.1 - 24.0 
1967-71 30.5 33.9 48.7 - 56.0 - 54.5 
1972-76 38.2 34.2 31.2 - 33.8 - 31.9 
1977-81 16.6 21.5 30.3 34.0 36.2 39.2 37.2 
Percentage Ratio to GNP 
- - - - 1953-61 6.9 8.9 - 
1962-66 6.4 8.5 12.3 - 12.7 - 14.9 
1967-71 9.6 10.9 29.1 - 28.5 - 31.6 
1972-76 11.0 12.7 34.2 38.5b 38.4 49.9b 38.9 
1977-81 10.5 11.2 35.2 43.4 43.0 60.9 46.2 
Source: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, various issues. 
aIncluding credits by nonmonetary financial institutions. 
bAverage for 1974-76. 
Table 10.A.5 The Sectoral Allocation of Domestic and Foreign Loans: Korean Manufacturing 
(in billions won) 
1971 1976 1981 
Bank Total Bank Total Bank Total 
Loans Loans Loans Loans Loans Loans 
Clothing and footwear 
Food products 
Electronic products 
Metal products 
Miscellaneous manufactures 
Textiles 
Wood products 
Basic chemicals 
Machinery 
Transport equipment 
Iron and steel 
Nonferrous metal products 
Cement 
Fertilizers 
Petroleum products 
All manufactures 
15(l. I )  
37(2.2) 
8(1.1) 
3(0.9) 
1 l(0.9) 
86(1.9) 
27(4.5) 
20(3.0) 
16( 1.3) 
34(2.2) 
15(2.6) 
l(1.8) 
25( 1.7) 
12(0.8) 
3(0.2) 
371(1.5) 
IS( 1.1) 
50(3.1) 
9(1.2) 
3(0.9) 
1 l(0.9) 
131(2.9) 
28(4.7) 
31(4.6) 
20(1.7) 
50(3.3) 
29(5.0) 
2(2.0) 
75(5.0) 
40(2.8) 
75(5.1) 
637(2.5) 
175(0.9) 
174( 1.2) 
57(0.4) 
26(0.7) 
59(0.7) 
463( 1.4) 
129(2.6) 
78(0.9) 
117(0.8) 
230(1.5) 
233( 1.6) 
49( 1.4) 
66( 1.1) 
38(0.8) 
7(0.1) 
2,149(1.1) 
185(0.9) 
l98( 1.3) 
77(0.6) 
29(0.7) 
63(0.8) 
615(1.9) 
134(2.7) 
140(1.6) 
142(0.9) 
4O4(2.6) 
505(3.4) 
75(2.1) 
136(2.2) 
66(1.4) 
64(1.0) 
3,120( 1.6) 
566(0.8) 
272(0.6) 
495(0.7) 
405(1.2) 
325(0.7) 
1,527(1.1) 
303(2.8) 
531(1.2) 
741(0.9) 
1,581(1.9) 
1,039(1.2) 
393(2.8) 
213(1.0) 
105(0.7) 
583 1.5) 
10,105(1.1) 
584(0.8) 
325(0.7) 
549(0.8) 
446( 1.3) 
339(0.8) 
2,146( 1 3 
3 1 O(2.9) 
764(1.7) 
1,048( 1.3) 
1,816(2.2) 
2,189(2.5) 
477(3.4) 
380(1.7) 
257( 1.7) 
926(2.4) 
13,798( 1.5) 
Source: Bank of Korea, Financial Statements Analysis, various issues. 
Nofes: Total loans represent the sum of domestic bank loans and foreign loans. Figures in parentheses represent 
loadvalue-added ratios. Miscellaneous manufactures include furniture, pottery, clay products, and miscellaneous 
nonmetallic mineral products. Electronic products include ratios and televisions. 
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Table 10.A.6 Exports of Manufactures in Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore 
(in billions of dollars) 
Korea Taiwan Hong Kong Singapore 
1970 1980 1970 1980 1970 1980 1971 1980 
Clothing and footwear 
Textiles 
Elec. and telecom. equip. 
Precision instruments 
Misc. manufactures 
Wood and furniture 
Metal products 
Food products 
Nonmetallic mineral 
Petroleum products 
Chemicals 
Steel products 
Nonferrous metal 
Machinery 
Transport equip. 
All manufactures 
All commodities 
0.2 3.7 0.2 3.8 0.7 4.8 
0.1 2.2 0.2 1.8 0.2 0.9 
- 1.6 0.2 2.5 0.2 1.3 
0.3 - 0.4 - 0.5 
0.1 1.0 0.2 2.9 0.6 2.6 
0.1 0.4 0.1 1.1 - 0.1 
- 0.8 - 0.8 0.1 0.4 
- 0.4 0.1 0.7 - 0.1 
0.4 - 0.5 - 0.1 
0.8 - 0.6 - 0.1 
- 1.3 0.1 0.3 - - 
0.1 - 0.1 - 0.1 
- 0.8 0.1 1.8 0.1 1.2 
1.1 - 0.6 - 
0.7 16.2 1.2 18.4 2.0 13.2 
0.8 17.5 1.4 19.7 2.0 13.7 
- 
- 
- 0.3 - - - -  
- 
- 
- - 
0.6 
0.8a 
0.4 
0.2 
2.0 
0.2 
0.2 
0.3 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
5.4 
0.3 
0.1 
0.1 
0.8 
0.3 
10.4 
12.6a 
~ ~~~~ 
Sources: United Nations, Commodity Trade Statistics; and Inspectorate-General of Customs, 
Taiwan, The Trade of China (Taiwan District). 
aIncluding oil bunkers of $1,199 million in 1980 and oil bunkers of $78 million in 1971 (data 
from Department of Statistics, Singapore, Yearbook of Statistics). 
Table 10.A.7 Exports of Machinery and Equipment: Korea and Taiwan (1981) 
Exports 
(millions of 
dollars) 
Capital Intensity 
Taiwan Korea in Koreaa 
Electric motors, generators, and generating sets 100 14 10.42 
Sewing machines and parts 202 16 6.23 
Machine tools and parts for particular industries 97 17 6.68 
Air pumps and gas compressors 34 2 5.78 
Lifting and loading machinery and conveyors 59 19 8.62 
Electrical equipment for internal combustion engines 29 2 9.24 
Electromechanical domestic appliances I81 14 12.24 
Apparatus for making or breaking electric circuits 158 67 10.15 
Calculating and office machines and parts 27 1 94 9.97 
Subtotal 
Other machinery and parts 
(Metal-cutting machine tools) 
1,131 245 9.23 
1,019 652 15.94 
(183) (28) (17.22) 
- 11.74 All manufacturing - 
Sources: Korean Traders Association, Foreign Trade Statistics; Economic Planning Board, 
Report on Mining and Manufacturing Census; and Inspectorate-General of Customs, Taiwan, 
The Trade of China (Taiwan District). 
aCapital stock per worker in thousands of dollars in 1981. 
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Notes 
1. By allowing tariff-exempt free imports of raw materials, intermediate 
inputs, and investment goods for export production activities, the Korean 
government has tried to prevent its own protectionist import-restrictive regime 
from adversely affecting the incentives for export activities. Furthermore, it 
has tried to reduce the degree of overall import restrictions as Korea’s ability 
to earn foreign exchange becomes enhanced through export promotion. 
2. In effect, this is an example of a general pattern of subsidized capital 
formation in fast-growing economies discussed by Bradford in chapter 7 of this 
volume. 
3. According to the input-output data (Bank of Korea, Input-Output Tables 
of Korea), the proportion of manufactured goods in total commodity exports 
was 47% in 1960, rising to 86% in 1970 and to 95% in 1980. Apparently, the 
input-output tables regarded many primary products, which are only slightly 
processed, as manufactured goods. The fact that these types of commodities 
composed a relatively large portion of Korea’s exports in the 1950s causes the 
differences between the SITC and input-output table classifications of manu- 
factured goods exports as a percentage of total exports in the early period. 
4. According to Hirschman (1958, 37), “In underdeveloped countries, . . . 
a readiness to save and invest exists, but is being frustrated. . . . [Tlhe total 
supply of savings is highly responsive to the appearance of new investment 
opportunities.” 
5. As a result of the exposure to the affluent living standards of advanced 
countries after the opening up to trade, the people in a poor country may desire 
a more rapid rate of economic growth, and consequently the structure of time 
preference changes in such a fashion as to make the savings propensity higher 
in the poor country than in the rich country. 
6. The increase in real wages during 1962-66 was negligible: - 4% per annum 
if the GNP deflator for the whole industry is applied, and 1% per annum if the 
wholesale price index is applied. (The consumer price index for the period 
1962-66 is not available.) 
7. The 1980 prices for capital stock were obtained by applying the GNP 
deflator for gross fixed capital formation in manufacturing, and those for wages 
by applying the GNP deflator for value added in manufacturing (instead of the 
consumer price index, because we are concerned with the cost aspect rather 
than with the workers’ welfare aspect). Since the estimated point elasticity 
depends crucially on price deflators, the absolute magnitude of an estimated 
elasticity itself may not be very meaningful. 
8. According to the 1-0 statistics, there were also significant exports of light 
electrical machinery and automobiles and parts in 1960. However, these exports 
might well have been listed as occasional reexports: exports of these items 
became negligible in the 1-0 statistics for 1963, 1966, and 1968. 
9. In 1970 about 90% of miscellaneous manufactures exports consisted of 
wigs, and the rest consisted of toys, sporting goods, musical instruments, and 
travel goods. 
10. In 1970 about 47% of Korea’s exports went to the United States, about 
28% to Japan, and about 10% to the European Community. Exports to OPEC 
countries expanded from less than 2% of total exports in 1970 to more than 
10% by 1980. Exports to other developing countries expanded from about 11% 
of total exports in 1970 to about 22% in 1980. Exports to the European Com- 
munity also expanded to about 19% of total exports in 1980, but the shares of 
the United States and Japan fell drastically to about 28% and 18% respectively. 
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1 1 .  In 1970 about 52% of Korea’s imports of nonfuel primary products were 
from the United States, about 4.2% from Canada, New Zealand, and Australia, 
and about 24% from developing countries. In 1980 the share of the developing 
countries increased to about 31%, and the share of Canada, New Zealand, and 
Australia to about 12.4%. The share of the developing countries in Korea’s 
manufactures imports increased from about 2.4% in 1970 to about 4.4% in 1980. 
As of 1981 about 30% of Korea’s imports were mineral fuels, 27% were other 
primary products, about 22% were machinery and transport equipment, and 
21% were other manufactures. 
12. In the 1970s total domestic credits increased from a magnitude equivalent 
to about 50% of GNP (1974-76) to about 60% (1977-81). The proportion of 
securities in domestic credits increased from about 5% to about 8%. The pro- 
portion of domestic credits provided through nonmonetary financial institutions 
excluding KDB and EXIMB (i.e., provided through investment companies, 
savings institutions, life insurance companies, and the Korea Long-Term Credit 
Bank) steadily increased from a magnitude equivalent to about 3% of GNP in 
1969 to about 1270 of GNP by 1981. 
13. They amounted to only about 12% of total loans in 1962-66 and about 
19% in 1967-71. 
14. The real interest rate applied to discounts of commercial bills amounted 
to - 5.6% per annum on average in 1954-61, - 3.2% in 1962-66,9.4% in 1967- 
71, -2.5% in 1972-76, and -0.9% in 1977-81. 
15. The weighted-average real interest rate on all loans provided by all 
banking institutions in Korea amounted to - 14.4% per annum in 1962-64, 
4.1% in 1965-71, and - 6.2% in 1972-76, while the real interest rate applied 
to discounts of commercial bills amounted to -7.1%, 9.5%, and -2.5% in 
each period. This implies that the rates on discounts of commercial bills ov- 
erestimate the real interest rates on total bank loans by 4%7% (see Hong 
According to the 1MF World Economic Outlook (Washington, D.C., 1983, 
204), the (weighted average) long-term “real” interest rates in major industrial 
countries amounted to about 1.2% per annum in 1976-79, and those in Japan, 
which is believed to practice an extensive credit-rationing system, amounted 
to about 2.6% per annum. 
16. Since 1980, there were significant devaluations and high interest rates 
worldwide, which effectively terminated the era of low-cost foreign borrowing 
for Korean businessmen. 
17. The M2 statistics of Korea include a substantial amount of corporate 
time and savings deposits. These are mostly forced savings extracted by the 
banks from corporations as a condition for bank loans. Their effect is to raise 
the statistics of both bank credits and time and savings deposits simultaneously. 
If we subtract these corporate time and savings deposits both from the aggregate 
time and savings deposit figures and from the aggregate domestic credit figures, 
the volume of total domestic credits provided through DMB, KDB, and EXIMB 
would be reduced by around 7% of GNP on average, and consequently, the 
magnitude of subsidies associated with domestic bank loan allocations would 
be reduced by about 1.6% of GNP per annum on average in the 1970s. Even 
in Japan, “traditionally banks offer loans to the firm on the condition that some 
proportion of the loan be deposited into time deposit balances. This implies a 
reduced availability from a given size, or equivalently, a higher effective rate 
of return to the bank.” 
18. In a relative sense, textiles and wood products (mostly plywood) were 
the leading export sectors of Korea only in the 1960s. In the 1970s Korea’s 
1979, 162-201). 
304 Wontack Hong 
competitive power in synthetic fiber yarn seems to have been rather limited 
because of the expensive domestic supply of synthetic fiber materials. Korea’s 
competitive power in synthetic fiber fabrics was limited by the requirement of 
sophisticated advanced technologies, and Korea’s natural fiber yarn industry 
had to compete with other, less-developed countries (such as China). The 
plywood industry suffered from export restrictions on timber by resource-rich 
countries (such as Indonesia and the Philippines). 
19. Among the three sectors included in this group, iron and steel revealed 
the highest elasticity (1.78). This reflects the construction of a large-scale in- 
tegrated steel mill in the 1970s. 
20. The export-output ratios of fertilizers and cement amounted to 29% and 
17% respectively in 1980; however, the more important aspect of this group 
may be the drastic fall in the import dependence of fertilizers. 
21. Some capital-intensive sectors revealed extremely high rates of elastic- 
ities. However, the increasing capital intensity of some of these sectors was 
mainly due to the introduction of new capital-intensive production within each 
sector, such as an integrated steel mill, petrochemical complexes, a modern 
shipyard, and automobile assembly lines. Therefore, unless there occur con- 
tinual additions of extremely capital-intensive production, one may expect that 
the rates of increase in capital intensities of these sectors will significantly slow 
down in the 1980s and that the possible continuing allocation of subsidized 
loans will impact mostly the output-expanding effect rather than the factor- 
substitution effect. 
22. Capital-intensive manufactures consist of chemicals, steel products, 
nonferrous metal products, electrical and nonelectrical machinery, and trans- 
port equipment. 
23. Unlike the other advanced developing countries, clothing and footwear 
(including leather products) have never been a leading export sector in Singa- 
pore. The export of other labor-intensive products such as textiles, wood and 
furniture, metal products, and miscellaneous manufactures was also relatively 
insignificant. The leading export sector of Singapore was petroleum refining, 
and the second leading export sector was assembling of electronic products 
(see table 10.A.6). On the other hand, the distinct feature of Korean exports 
was the importance of steel products and transport equipment (especially ships) 
and the relative insignificance of electrical and nonelectrical machinery. 
24. A low rate of inflation coupled with high real rates of interest on deposits 
in Taiwan seem to have been conducive to a rapid increase in the supply of 
loanable funds in Taiwan. The money/GNP ratio in Taiwan increased from 
about 16% in 1953 to 35% in 1962, to 65% in 1973, and to 83% in 1978. On the 
other hand, the money/GNP ratio in Korea jumped from about 12% in 1965 to 
34% in 1970, but the ratio was still 34% in 1979. 
25. In Korea the capital intensity of the (electrical and nonelectrical) ma- 
chinery sector amounted to about $13.5 thousand, while that of all manufac- 
turing amounted to about $11.7 thousand per worker in 1981. In Taiwan the 
capital intensity of the machinery sector amounted to about $1 1 thousand per 
worker, while that of all manufacturing amounted to about $12 thousand per 
worker in 1976 (in 1981 prices). In Taiwan steel products and rubber products 
could also be classified as relatively labor-intensive sectors, while in Korea 
these sectors had above-average capital intensities and, hence, could be clas- 
sified as capital-intensive sectors. 
26. General trading companies were formally introduced in 1976, but those 
companies had been actively exporting even before they were officially chris- 
tened with the “general trading” title. All the firms which are owned by the 
same owner of a general trading company were grouped together here and then 
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regarded as a general-trading-company group. Approximately half of the ex- 
ports of these groups consist of manufactures directly produced by the groups 
themselves. Small export producers who exported through the general-trading- 
company groups obtained loan allocations through these groups in the form of 
local loans and credits. 
27. The share of the next forty-one largest groups of exporting firms did 
not change much in the 1970s. However, the share of the next 103 groups in 
total commodity exports declined from about 22% in 1970 to about 8% in 1981. 
Furthermore, the share of the remaining small firms that were not included 
among the 153 groups of exporting firms declined from about 45% of Korea’s 
total commodity exports in 1970 to about 25% by 1981. 
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